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Comment
BANK TENDER OFFERS: DEREGULATING WITHOUT
LOSING CONTROL
"Among regulated industries, none is better insulated from hostile takeover
than banking.'"'
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex and conflicting state and federal rules discourage the
acquisition of bank securities. Despite these regulatory difficulties,
however, since financial institutions are highly profitable businesses
they remain attractive takeover targets-particularly for other banks
interested in expansion. By increasing their assets, banks can in-
crease their lending limits to individual customers, thereby at-
tracting large corporate borrowers.2
Maryland banks are especially desirable acquisition targets for a
number of reasons. The Baltimore-Washington corridor has one of
the highest per capita incomes in the United States,' the economy is
stable,4 and the area has strategic significance for entering new fi-
nancial markets.5 There is also a high percentage of undeveloped
commercially zoned land6 that will require industrial construction
lending. Moreover, the passage of two interstate banking acts by
the 1985 Maryland General Assembly7 will undoubtedly increase
1. J. HAWKE & N. PETERSEN, BANK ACQUISITIONS AND HOLDING COMPANY EXPAN-
SIONS 646 (1980) (hereinafter HAWKE & PETERSEN).
2. Both federal and state law restrict the amounts banks can lend to their customers
and shareholders. For example, Maryland law limits loans to any individual customer to
thirty percent (30%) of the unimpaired capital and surplus of the commercial bank. MD.
FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 3-601(a) (1980).
3. See MARKET ON THE GROW: PROFILE OF THE BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON CORRIDOR
AND THE GREATER LAUREL AREA (n.d.) (available from the Greater Laurel Chamber of
Commerce) (stating that the "per capita income of$12,802 is 20 percent higher than the
national average and [the corridor's] effective buying power of more than $58 billion,
fourth in the nation, is expected to be $101 billion by 1986"). See also The Baltimore
Sun, Aug. 2, 1985, at l1D, col. 5.
4. The Baltimore Sun, Aug. 2, 1985, at 14D, col. 3.
5. Id. at 14D, col. 2, 3.
6. Id. at 14D, col. 2.
7. Maryland's statutory amendments, effective July 1, 1985, enable out-of-state
bank holding companies to acquire Maryland banks upon Bank Commissioner approval
if the holding companies come from a specified region or if, under special circum-
stances, they meet capital formation requirements and make significant contributions to
Maryland's economy without diverting capital from existing Maryland banks. See The
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the number of bank takeover attempts in the state since certain re-
gional out-of-state banks and bank holding companies may now ac-
quire Maryland banking institutions for the first time.' This will
provide out-of-state banks with automatic access to the lending mar-
kets described above, but will not alleviate the difficulties involved
in bank acquisitions caused by confusing and conflicting federal
regulations.
To comprehend the intricacies of takeover attempts in the
banking industry, one must first understand how banks are regu-
lated, how they are owned, and the means by which they may be
acquired. The United States has a dual banking system made up of
national and state-chartered banks. Due to numerous past financial
crises,9 the system is highly regulated. National banks, created by
the National Bank Act of 1864, are regulated by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).'" State banks are regulated by
Reciprocal Interstate Banking Act, ch. 113, 1985 Md. Laws 1552; Act of May 21, 1985,
ch. 114, 1985 Md. Laws 1567.
8. The Bank Holding Company Act specifically prohibits the Federal Reserve Board
from granting authority for a bank holding company from one state to acquire any
shares of a state bank from another state absent the latter state's enabling legislation. 12
U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). This section, known as the Douglas Amend-
ment, was introduced as a compromise position during Senate floor debate between
parties seeking full interstate banking, and those who wanted no bank holding company
acquisitions across state lines. See S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2482, 2492; see also Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 105 S. Ct. 2545, 2550-53 (1985). For
many years, the Douglas Amendment served to limit acquisitions of state banks by out-
of-state bank holding companies because no states passed permissive legislation. In
1976, Iowa passed limited legislation, and Maine, in 1975, legalized out-of-state bank
holding company acquisitions of Maine banks for "companies" from states passing re-
ciprocal legislation. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.1805 (West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9-B, § 1013 (1980 & Supp. 1985). See generally HAWKE & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at
640-46 (discussing the Douglas Amendment and its impact on interstate banking). The
1980s have seen significant activity in interstate banking; some states have passed per-
missive legislation which only allows bank holding companies from specific geographic
regions to acquire in-state banks. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 167A, § 2 (West
1984); 1983 CONN. ACTS § 83-411 (Reg. Sess.). In June, 1985, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that regional banking statutes from Connecticut and Massachusetts
did not violate the commerce, compacts, and equal protection clauses of the United
States Constitution. Northeast Bancorp, 105 S. Ct. 2553-56. This decision paves the way
for the establishment of regional banking zones in various areas of the country and at
the same time allows states to deny access to out-of-state banking giants. While the
intricacies of regional banking, the Douglas Amendment, and Northeast Bancorp are be-
yond the scope of this Comment, it is important to understand that there will be an
increase in bank acquisition activity resulting from the 1985 legislative session, and, as a
result, tender offers will undoubtedly increase in number.
9. See Friedman and Friesen, A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation: Getting From
Here to There, 43 MD. L. REV. 413, 416-22 (1984).
10. Act ofJune 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
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the Federal Reserve Board (the FRB) if they are Federal Reserve
System members," or by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (the FDIC) if they are insured non-member banks. 12 Banks lo-
cated in Maryland are also supervised by the Maryland Bank
Commissioner.'" Finally, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) regulates federally insured savings and loan associations
which, although technically not banks, are subject to similar change-
of-control regulations and legislation.' 4
American banks can be privately or publicly owned. Some are
owned by individuals, others by stockholders, and still others by
bank holding companies, which are companies formed for the spe-
cific purpose of owning bank securities."' Like other businesses,
banks can be acquired through the purchase of assets, by merger, or
by stock acquisitions such as tender offers. Tender offers involve
attempts to acquire a controlling interest in a target bank through
the purchase of a sufficient number of issued and outstanding shares
owned by existing stockholders. In friendly tender offers, the target
bank's board of directors recommends that the shareholders accept
the offer, and makes no effort to maintain control. In hostile situa-
tions, the existing board opposes the offer and affirmatively at-
tempts to prevent the takeover by utilizing one or more of a host of
tender offer defenses. 16
This Comment primarily concerns hostile tender offers for
bank securities. It addresses differences between the Williams
Act,' 7 which applies to all tender offers, and federal and state bank-
11. Friedman and Friesen, supra note 9, at 421.
12. Id. at 422. "By the end of 1982, the FDIC had become the primary regulator for
8833 state-chartered non-member banks." Id. (citing FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE COR-
PORATION, 1982 STATISTICS ON BANKING 6 (statistics provided as of December 31, 1982)).
13. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. §§ 2-101 to -112 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
14. See Friedman and Friesen, supra note 9, at 422; see also 12 U.S.C. § 17 30(q)(1)
(1982) (the Change in Savings and Loan Control Act).
15. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (the BHCA) defines a bank holding
company, with certain specified exclusions, as "any company which has control over any
bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this
act." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982). Companies owning or controlling bank stock may
not be considered bank holding companies if they own or control shares in a fiduciary
capacity, if they acquire bank stock in an underwriting capacity for a short period of
time, or in four other specified circumstances. Id. §§ 1841(a)(5)(A)-(F).
16. See generally Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: A Dissenting View and Rec-
ommended Reforms, 43 MD. L. REV. 225, 227 (1984) (tender offers "frequently involve a
contest for control of the management of a company in transactions not subject to vote
by the shareholders of either the offeror or target [bank]"). For a discussion of defen-
sive maneuvers employable by the target company's management, see Steinberg, Some
Thoughts on Regulation of Tender Offers, 43 MD. L. REV. 240 (1984).
17. The Williams Act was enacted in 1968 as an amendment to the Securities Ex-
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ing laws, which ensure the soundness of financial institutions and
encourage full competition among American banks. The Williams
Act places incumbent management and the tender offeror on an
equal footing, so that neither has an advantage during takeover at-
tempts. 18 On the other hand, the banking laws and the regulations
promulgated thereunder place grave restrictions on persons or cor-
porations who try to acquire controlling interests in banks, and thus
give incumbent management a distinct advantage over the offeror.
The result is antithetical to the legislative intent behind the Williams
Act.
Banking laws which govern changes in corporate control' 9 not
only conflict with the Williams Act, but they also are inconsistent
among themselves. They require that persons or organizations ac-
quiring "controlling" interests in banks obtain prior federal and/or
state approval. However, the laws contain different definitions of
"control." Additionally, the approving agency will vary, depending
on the bank being acquired and the business form of the offeror.
The results can be desperately confusing because offerors must
sometimes seek approval from different agencies at different times
during the takeover process. Finally, the banking laws delay the ac-
quisition process, enabling incumbent management to forestall any
change in control, and sometimes to chill the tender offer
completely.
To eliminate the confusion, discrepancies, and delays caused by
the differences between the Williams Act and the banking laws, this
Comment recommends changes in the manner in which persons ac-
quiring controlling interests in banks obtain regulatory agency ap-
proval. The recommendations are three. First, to reduce existing
confusion, the primary banking regulator should be responsible for
any required approval, regardless of the offeror's business form.
For the purpose of reducing discrepancies, the second recom-
mended change is that banking laws should be amended so that
their definitions of "control" are the same. Finally, to reduce de-
lays, the approval period should be restructured so that the even-
change Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 781(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
18. See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 251 (arguing that putting the offeror and target
corporation on equal footing helps ensure that shareholders can make informed deci-
sions in deciding whether to tender their shares).
19. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (1982) (the Change of Bank Control Act of 1978); 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1982) (The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956); MD. FIN. INST.
CODE ANN. § 3-314 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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handed Williams Act approach applies to bank acquisitions as it
does to other tender offers.
Because the financial services industry is so highly regulated,
this Comment will not address every type of acquisition, or the leg-
islative and regulatory effect on every type of financial institution.
For example, although many of the same control acquisition restric-
tions apply to bank mergers as to tender offers, separate legislation
governs mergers.20 Also, similar acquisition restrictions apply to
banks, bank holding companies, and federally insured savings and
loan associations. In the interest of simplicity, this Comment will be
limited to a discussion of the acquisition of Maryland state-chartered
bank securities by individuals and bank holding companies. Finally,
since all bank regulatory agency change-of-control and tender offer
regulations are similar (with the exception of those governing acqui-
sitions by bank holding companies), only FDIC regulations will be
addressed in depth. FRB regulations will, however, be discussed to
the extent they apply to bank holding company acquisitions of state
bank securities.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
There are three legislative elements affecting tender offers for
state-chartered non-member bank securities. First, if the tender of-
fer will result in an individual, group of individuals, or company
(other than a bank holding company) obtaining "control" of the tar-
get bank, the offeror 21 must comply with the Change of Bank Con-
trol Act of 197822 (the Control Act) by notifying the primary
regulator (the FDIC) prior to the actual purchase of voting securi-
ties. Specifically, this means that the offeror may not acquire more
than ten percent of a bank's outstanding capital voting stock without
notifying the appropriate bank regulator sixty days before the acqui-
sition takes place.23 Maryland law also requires that similar notifica-
tion be made to the State Bank Commissioner.24
20. See, e.g., The Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1982).
21. Since the scope of this Comment is limited to tender offers, the acquiring party
will hereinafter be referred to as the "offeror." In the event that a specific regulation
refers only to one type of offeror (e.g., a bank holding company), the offeror will be
referred to specifically.
22. Change of Bank Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. VI, 92 Stat. 3641
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 18170) (1982)).
23. 12 C.F.R. § 303.15(a) (1986).
24. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 3-314(c)(1) (1980 & Supp. 1985). The Maryland
statute defines "stock acquisition" as an acquisition of the outstanding voting stock of a
commercial bank or bank holding company in Maryland if the acquisition will affect the
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Second, if the security acquisition is by a bank holding company
rather than by an individual, the acquisition is governed by the Bank
Holding Company Act of 195625 (the BHCA), rather than by the
Control Act. The BHCA requires that companies obtain FRB ap-
proval: (1) prior to becoming bank holding companies (i.e., ob-
taining twenty-five percent of a single bank's securities); and
(2) prior to obtaining five percent of a bank's securities after the
twenty-five percent threshold first is met. 26
When the BHCA applies to the security acquisition, the Control
Act does not.27 For example, when a company that owns less than
ten percent of a bank's stock attempts to acquire more than twenty-
five percent, the BHCA applies. The Control Act does not, even
though the company acquires more than a ten percent ownership
interest. Furthermore, whenever a company owning twenty-five
percent of a bank's securities attempts to increase its holdings of any
bank's securities by five percent or more, it must seek FRB BHCA
approval again since it is, by definition, a bank holding company.28
On the other hand, a company that reaches the ten percent mark
without attempting to obtain twenty-five percent control as part of
the same transaction must comply with the Control Act.
The third legislative element is that tender offer acquisitions
must comply with section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.29 The Securities and Exchange Commission does not regu-
late tender offers for bank securities. 30 Section 12(i) of the Ex-
change Act 3 ' vests in the primary banking regulator (the OCC, the
FDIC, the FRB, or the FHLBB) the duty to administer and enforce
certain provisions, including the Williams Act tender offer sections,
when the target company is a bank or a federally insured savings
and loan association.
The delays caused by the BHCA and Control Act reviews con-
flict with the intent of the Williams Act3 2 and the regulations3 s
power to direct or cause the direction of the management or policy of any banking insti-
tution or bank holding company, or an acquisition of stock of a commercial bank if the
acquisition would give one person control of twenty-five percent or more of the voting
stock of the commercial bank. Id. § 3-314(a)(3).
25. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
26. Id. § 1842(a).
27. Id. § 1817j)(16) (1982).
28. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(d)(1)(i) (1986).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
30. Id. § 781(i).
31. Id.
32. See supra note 17.
33. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to .14d-101, 240.14e-1 to .14e-2 (1986).
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promulgated thereunder. The securities regulations generally re-
quire full disclosure by both the offeror and target management
whenever tender offers are made for shares in publicly held corpo-
rations, including banks and bank holding companies.34 Congress'
Williams Act purpose was to ensure that shareholders received full
and complete information to enable them to make informed choices
when deciding whether or not to tender their shares.3 5 Congress
did not intend, however, that either the existing board or the offeror
have any advantage during a hostile tender offer.36 This neutral po-
sition is achieved by regulations that ensure that the offer proceed in
a timely fashion. Any delay benefits incumbent management by pro-
viding more time for defensive "tactics" and allowing a "cooling
off" period for the market.
In bank tender offers, state and federal statutes require full fi-
nancial disclosure to, and approval from, federal and state regula-
tors. 7 Offerors may make a tender offer for shares prior to
receiving the agency's approval, but they may not actually purchase
the tendered shares until the agency completes its review. Thus,
bank change-of-control regulations delay the process, giving the in-
cumbent board of directors time to defend against the acquisition. 8
The delay is compounded because some acquisitions require
the approval of four agencies: the primary regulator, the FRB, the
Department of Justice, and the state banking supervisor.3 " This can
lead to "false starts" caused by proceeding under one agency's reg-
ulations when another's will ultimately be followed. This occurs, for
example, when a person begins a tender offer in an individual capac-
ity, and subsequently decides to form a bank holding company. In
such a case, notice to the FDIC would be inapplicable, and the of-
feror would be required to send the FRB a new BHCA approval
application, further delaying the process.
The federal and state banking laws and regulations not only de-
lay tender offer consummation; their conflicting provisions also
34. 12 C.F.R. §§ 11.590, 206.8, 335.501 (1986).
35. See Steinberg, supra note 16, at 251.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(a), 1817(j) (1982).
38. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(1) (notice must be provided to the FDIC at least 60
days before the stock acquisition takes place).
39. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Essentially, the acquisition of control
must be approved by either the FDIC, the FRB, or the OCC, and by the Bank Commis-
sioner's office. Also, copies of bank holding company acquisitions are sent to the De-




present the incumbent board with a second advantage over the of-
feror in that there are many potential grounds to enjoin the tender
offer. For example, when an individual offeror makes a tender offer
for state-chartered non-member bank securities, the individual must
notify the primary regulator (i.e., the FDIC) sixty days prior to the
acquisition of control.4" If the FDIC does not disapprove the acquisi-
tion, the offeror may, on the sixty-first day, take down the tendered
shares and acquire control of the bank.4 Conversely, if the offeror
is a bank holding company, it must notify the FRB under the BHCA,
and Regulation Y promulgated thereunder,4 2 rather than the pri-
mary regulator under the Control Act.43 The FRB has either thirty
or sixty days to approve the acquisition. Unlike the Control Act pro-
vision, the lack of disapproval after the thirty or sixty day period is
not sufficient; the FRB must approve or the acquisition cannot pro-
ceed.4 4 Moreover, the notification threshold begins at either five or
twenty-five percent ownership under the BHCA, but not at ten, as is
the case under the Control Act.4 5 Finally, to further complicate
matters, and regardless of which federal change-of-control statute
applies, the offeror must also seek prior review from the Maryland
Bank Commissioner's office.46 The Commissioner has sixty days to
review the offeror's proposal; if he or she does not disapprove the
acquisition within that time, the tender offer may go forward.4 7
Because of the conflicting BHCA, Control Act, and state provi-
sions, the offeror must first determine which agency governs the
transaction. If the offeror applies to the wrong agency, the tender
offer can be enjoined. Where to apply should be a simple decision,
since there is a primary regulator for each type of bank. For exam-
ple, an offeror seeking state-chartered non-member bank securities
should apply for FDIC approval. Complications arise, however, be-
cause the type of bank being acquired is but one factor that deter-
40. 12 C.F.R. § 303.15(a) (1986) requires that notice must be given upon the acqui-
sition of ten percent control if the bank has issued securities subject to the Exchange Act
registration requirements, and if "[i]mmediately after the transaction no other person
will own a greater proportion of that class of voting securities."
41. The Control Act states that no person shall acquire control unless the primary
regulator has been given sixty days prior written notice and within that time has not
issued a notice of disapproval. The agency may extend the sixty day notice period for a
subsequent thirty day period without justification. 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(1).
42. 12 U.S.C. §8 1841-49 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 12 C.F.R. § 225.1-.43 (1986).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(a)(2), 225.11.
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3).
45. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
46. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 3-314(c)(1) (1980 & Supp. 1985).
47. Id. § 3-314(d).
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mines from which agency approval is required. Congress requires
bank holding companies to gain FRB approval, regardless of which
type of bank they are acquiring.48 Thus, if the incumbent board of
directors successfully argues that an offeror is a bank holding com-
pany that did not seek FRB approval, management can obtain a pre-
liminary injunction to halt the tender offer even though the offeror
notified the primary regulator (i.e., the FDIC).49
III. APPROVAL OF CONTROL-OBTAINING THE BANK
REGULATOR'S BLESSING
The underpinning of the federal and state change-of-control re-
quirements is to provide governmental review prior to any change
in control of a banking institution. Governmental review is desira-
ble to insure the continued financial viability of the nation's banks,5"
to promote competition, and to promote "the general purposes of
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933-to prevent unduly extensive con-
nections between banking and other businesses." ' However, meet-
ing the review requirements delays acquisitions and the ability of
tender offerors to rapidly take down shares.
A. The Change of Bank Control Act
The Change of Bank Control Act of 1978 (the Control Act)5 2
delays and confuses the tender offer process. It provides that no
person shall acquire control of an insured bank through a disposi-
tion of voting stock unless the appropriate federal agency has been
given sixty-days' prior written notice, and within that time has not
disapproved the acquisition.5" This requirement applies to all fed-
erally regulated acquisitions by an offeror other than a bank holding
company.
The Control Act accomplished a goal with which regulators had
long been concerned. Prior to its passage, the FRB had to approve
acquisitions by bank holding companies, but no agency reviewed ac-
quisitions by individuals. Companies could find individuals to
48. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
49. Cf. FDIC v. D'Annunzio, 524 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. W. Va. 1981) (injunction follow-
ing failure to comply with the Change of Bank Control Act notification requirements).
50. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp.,
439 U.S. 234, 236 (1978).
51. S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2385, 2386.
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (1982).
53. Id. § 1817(j)(1).
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purchase bank stock for them, and so avoid the BHCA require-
ments. Alternatively, an individual could purchase the securities
and hold them until the bank holding company qualified for stock
ownership, and then sell the shares to the holding company. The
Control Act put an end to this practice by making individuals obtain
agency approval, and by providing civil penalties for those who did
not.54
The Control Act drafters' intent was to ensure full information
disclosure to the federal reviewing authorities.55 Federal banking
agencies can issue rules and regulations to reduce these disclosure
requirements,56 but the Control Act remains a roadblock that makes
it more difficult for both friendly and unfriendly tender offers to suc-
ceed. When the tender offer is friendly, the offeror may shy away
from releasing personal and highly confidential financial informa-
tion. When the offer is hostile, seeking and achieving notice that the
acquisition will not be disapproved within sixty days becomes of
paramount importance.
The Control Act requires the offeror to provide the reviewing
authority with detailed information concerning the offeror and its
business affiliations. For example, the offeror must provide a list
of its material business activities for the last five years, any pend-
ing legal or administrative proceedings that are material,59 any crim-
inal indictments or convictions,60 financial statements for each of
the five preceding years (and interim financial statements for the pe-
riod immediately preceding the acquisition),6' a description of how
the offeror intends to make the acquisition, 62 the source of the of-
feror's funds for making the acquisition and a full description of any
54. See id. § 1817j)(15) (providing for a ten thousand dollar per day civil penalty for
each day in which a violation of the Act continues to exist).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 1817(j)(13) permits the issuance of rules and regulations. Id. § 1817(j)(6)
(the notice section) allows agencies by regulation to change the information required of
the offeror. Some agencies have taken the Congress at its word and, for example, re-
duced the financial reporting requirements. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 225.43 (1986), in which
the OCC permits offerors to provide it with their most recent financial statement, rather
than one for each of the most recent five years. This regulation makes eminently good
sense since most individuals, no matter how wealthy, do not have complete financial,
income, or source and application of funds statements prepared, in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles, every year for five years.
57. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(6).
58. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(A).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(B).
62. Id. § 1817()(6)(C).
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loan associated with the acquisition,6 3 any plans for liquidation,
merger, or changes in corporate management or structure, 64 identi-
fication of any person involved with soliciting stock for the offeror,6 5
copies of all tender offer materials, 66 and any additional relevant in-
formation.6 7 Since many investors prefer not to disclose this type of
information, bank tender offers are often chilled before they get
started.
The threat of disapproval also discourages tender offers for
bank shares. The Control Act provides specific guidelines under
which the regulatory agency can deny approval for acquisition of
control. Specifically, approval may be denied when the primary reg-
ulator finds that: (1) the offeror's financial condition might jeopard-
ize the bank's financial position or prejudice depositors' interests;
(2) the offeror's (or proposed management's) "competence, experi-
ence, or integrity" would prejudice the bank's depositors' interests;
or (3) the offeror fails to provide the agency with adequate notifica-
61tion.68 If unsuccessful at an agency acquisition approval hearing,
the offeror may obtain judicial review before a United States Court
of Appeals.69 Absent judicial reversal, agency Control Act disap-
proval prevents tender offer consummation.
While the Control Act financial disclosure requirements and the
threat of disapproval stifle the bank tender offer climate, the real
Control Act threat is that the delay caused during the sixty-day ap-
proval period will prevent completion of a hostile tender offer. The
Control Act requires that offerors provide the regulatory agency
with copies of all tender offer materials.7" The FDIC regulations, as
an example, require the completion of a "Notice of Acquisition of
Control,"7 with which the "tender offer materials" must be submit-
ted, including the bidder's offer, the related transmittal letter, press
63. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(D).
64. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(E).
65. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(F).
66. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(G).
67. As with many other Federal reporting requirements, the government has devel-
oped a form which the offeror may submit to satisfy the notification requirements. The
FDIC version is entitled "Notice of Acquisition of Control" (FDIC Form 6822/01
(7/82)).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(7)(C)-(E).
69. Id. § 1817()(5).
70. Id. § 1817(j)(6)(G). Offerors complete a "Notice of Acquisition of Control" to
meet the Control Act requirements. Question nine on that form requires the offeror to
"[p]rovide copies of all . . . advertisements making a tender offer to stockholders for
purchase of their stock .
71. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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releases, advertisements, and other published materials which so-
licit, invite, or request tenders of securities.72 Therefore, the tender
offer, if one is intended, must be made before the FDIC Control Act
notice is sent. Even though the tender offer must be commenced prior
to the sixty day review period's beginning, the shares actually may
not be taken down until the agency has completed its review.73
Whereas the Control Act prohibits the acquisition of shares
before the end of the sixty-day review period, the Williams Act
grants shareholders an absolute right to withdraw their tendered
shares sixty days after the tender offer is made.7" Therefore, the
incumbent board of directors can defeat the tender offer by delaying
agency review, finding a "White Knight" to make an offer higher
than the original offeror's, and enticing shareholders to withdraw
their shares after the sixty-day Williams Act period has elapsed to
sell them instead to an offeror with whom the board of directors can
do business.75
The Williams Act regulations require that tender offers remain
open only for twenty days,76 but bank tender offers must remain
open longer because of the sixty-day Control Act notice period.
Therefore, opposing bidders or the current board have forty extra
days to mount a successful counter-offer or defense.77 Since tender
offers become public knowledge on the day they are commenced,
opposing bidders can immediately make counter-offers, with prior
knowledge of the existing bid. If the sixty-day Control Act notice
period expires, shareholders can withdraw their shares and accept
72. 12 C.F.R. § 335.501(b)(5)(1986).
73. 12 U.S.C. § 18170j)(1).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)(1981).
75. A White Knight is "[a] party sought out by the subject company to make a com-
peting offer--either a tender offer or an offer of merger-or to purchase and hold shares
in the subject company as a party friendly to that company's management." Goldberg,
Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: A Dissenting View and Recommended Reforms, 43 MD. L.
REV. 225, 239 (1984). Defensive measures of this nature can be defeated by the astute
offeror. The Control Act entitles the offeror to proceed with the acquisition prior to the
expiration of the sixty day approval period if he has received, from the agency, written
notice that the agency does not intend to disapprove the action. 12 U.S.C. § 18176j)(1).
Therefore, it should be a cardinal rule for those intending to make tender offers to gain
control of a bank that they request, at the time they submit their materials to the regulat-
ing Federal agency, specific notice from the agency after it has decided that the acquisi-
tion will not be disapproved.
76. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 335.510(a).
77. Shares can ordinarily be taken down after fifteen days. 12 C.F.R. § 335.507(1).
However, assuming that all potential shareholders do not tender their shares until the
expiration of the Williams Act twenty day period, banks can have as much as forty extra
days to mount a successful defense, since offerors cannot take down shares until the
Control Act or BHCA review is completed. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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the second bidder's higher offer. Even though second offerors also
must obtain FDIC approval prior to purchasing the tendered shares,
they are given an opportunity to make their offer, and perhaps gain
an advantage over the original offeror by making a higher bid dur-
ing the lengthy approval process.7 8
The Control Act thus impedes tender offers for bank securities
by private individuals. In general, it does not govern acquisitions by
companies. Corporate bank tender offers are, however, stymied by
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which predated the Con-
trol Act's passage by twenty-two years.
B. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
If a private investor or investing group decided, for tax pur-
poses79 or otherwise, to establish a company to own a controlling
interest in bank securities, that investor or group would immediately
run headlong into the Bank Holding Company Act (the BHCA),8 °
its amendments, and FRB regulations8" promulgated thereunder.
Acquisitions by bank holding companies (companies having "direct
or indirect control of a bank") 82 are generally governed by the
BHCA rather than the Control Act when the company acquires
twenty-five percent of the bank's voting securities. As with the Con-
trol Act, the BHCA creates hurdles which discourage tender
78. To further confuse the issue, technically, an acquisition resulting in control can-
not begin until the sixty day period has elapsed. Any tender offer, therefore, could vio-
late the Control Act if the acquisition activity began prior to the completion of the sixty
day period. The government, however, is cognizant of this possibility, and has provided
for it as follows. First, bidders are encouraged to phrase their tender offers in such a
way that the bidder is only required to take down the tendered shares if the change of
control application is approved. See, e.g., Offer to Purchase Shares of Common Stock of
the American Bank at $12.00 Per Share Net by David C. Lensing, at 2 (Nov. 6,
1984)(available from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Washington, D.C.).
Second, offerors are encouraged to request, at the time the change-of-control applica-
tion is filed, a notice of intent not to disapprove the change of control. See supra note 75
and accompanying text.
79. Assuming the bank is in the position to pay dividends on its stock, the Federal
income tax rates are more favorable if the dividend income is received at the corporate
level rather than at the individual level because of the provision which allows the deduc-
tion of eighty-five percent (85%) of dividends received by a domestic corporation sub-
ject to income tax. I.R.C. § 243(a)(1) (1984).
80. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
81. 12 C.F.R. 88 225.1-43 (1986). Known as Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225 governs
the formation of bank holding companies, the acquisition of target banks, and the main-
tenance of bank holding companies to insure the soundness of the banking system.




The FRB's position is that a bank holding company should
"serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidi-
ary banks . *... "84 Therefore, a rigorous approval process takes
place both before a company first acquires a twenty-five percent in-
terest in a bank's securities, and thereafter prior to additional acqui-
sitions of five percent of any bank's voting securities. In the case of
small one-bank holding companies, the FRB will not approve acqui-
sitions when the acquisition debt exceeds seventy-five percent of the
purchase price of the bank being acquired, "unless the owner can
demonstrate that such debt can be serviced without reliance on the
resources of the bank or bank holding company. "85 With regard to
other bank holding company acquisitions, the FRB may not approve
applications if the acquisition would result in a monopoly or would
lessen competition. 86 Bank holding companies must be registered
with the FRB, must report to the FRB, and must subject themselves
to FRB examinations and inspections.87
Regulations do not require the FRB to approve the formation
of a corporation whose corporate purpose is to become a bank holding
company. Rather, approval is required only when the corporation
becomes a bank holding company by attempting to acquire twenty-five
percent of the outstanding voting securities of a bank.88 Therefore,
technically, no BHCA approval application need be made until the
corporation seeks to acquire twenty-five percent control. Whenever
the bank holding company seeks to acquire an additional five per-
cent or more of any class of voting securities of a bank, it must again
seek FRB approval.89
The acquisition approval process is both time-consuming and
confusing. Prior to filing the application, the bank holding company
must publish in a local newspaper, on the same day for two consecu-
tive weeks, a notice of the proposed acquisition.' A copy of the first
83. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interrelation-
ship between the BHCA and the recent changes in Maryland's interstate banking laws.
84. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4; see also Policy Statement on Formation of Small One-Bank
Holding Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 225, Appendix B (requiring at least twenty-five percent
(25%) equity capital in any acquisition by a small one-bank holding company).
85. 12 C.F.R. § 225, Appendix B.
86. Id. § 225.13(a)(2). The FRB may make an exception if the anticompetitive effects
would be outweighed by the acquisition's positive effect on the "convenience and needs
of the community." Id.
87. Id. § 225.5(a)-(c).
88. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(d)(1).
89. Id. § 225.11(c).
90. Id. § 262.3.
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such notice must accompany the application for FRB approval."'
After receiving the application, the FRB must, within ten business
days, either accept the application, request additional information,
or return the application if substantially incomplete. 92 Once the ap-
plication is accepted, review will take place either at the FRB for the
region in which the target bank is located, or by the Board of Gover-
nors.93 If the FRB acts under its delegated authority, the review pe-
riod is generally limited to forty-five days. A review by the Board of
Governors generally takes sixty days, but may be extended. If the
Board accepts the application, all action must be completed thereon
within ninety-one days or the application will be deemed
approved.94
When the FRB receives the application, it will give the State
Bank Commissioner (or, in the case of a National Bank, the OCC)
thirty calendar days to provide approval recommendations. 5 The
FRB will also send notice of the application to the Federal Register for
publication, which will invite public comment for a thirty day pe-
riod.96 This public comment opportunity provides target manage-
ment and opposing offerors with a perfect opportunity to stymie the
tender offer. By convincing the FRB that the bank holding company
acquisition will be anticompetitive or monopolistic, they can obtain
FRB rejection and stop the tender offer in its tracks.
Following the receipt of public comments, the FRB will act on
the application. If the decision is to allow the acquisition, the BHCA
requires that the approved application be sent to the Department of
Justice for review of antitrust considerations. Because the Depart-
ment of Justice has thirty days in which to challenge the acquisi-
tion,97 the offeror may take no acquisition action until thirty days
after the approved application is sent.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 225.14(c).
93. Id. § 225.14(d)(1)-(2).
94. Id. § 225.14(g)(1).
95. Id. § 225.14(b).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 225.14(e); 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b)(1982). The BHCA incorporates the sub-
stantive provisions of the antitrust laws, including § 7 of the Clayton Act. Therefore, a
review of anticompetitive effects takes place by the FRB. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c). The
BHCA also requires an additional thirty day waiting period while the Department of
Justice reviews the application. 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b). This thirty day waiting period was
part of the original BHCA, and therefore predates the thirty day pre-merger waiting
period contained in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(1976) (currently 15 U.S.C. § 1892), by some twenty years. For a discussion of the rela-
tionship between the BHCA and Hart-Scott-Rodino, see Gorinson and Manishin, Garn-
St. Germain: A Harbinger of Change, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1313, 1344-45 (1983).
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Regardless of whether the Board of Governors or the regional
Reserve Bank reviews the application, the total elapsed time for ac-
quiring approval is well beyond the sixty days' Williams Act
timeframe.98 Like the analogous situation in which approval is
sought under the Control Act, the offeror is at a distinct disadvan-
tage when making an offer for bank shares because tendering share-
holders may withdraw their shares before the offeror is legally
permitted to take them down.
The relationship between the BHCA and regulations promul-
gated under the Control Act contains a basic inconsistency that can
confuse tender offerors and lead to defensive litigation. The BHCA
requires FRB approval when a bank holding company seeks to ac-
quire twenty-five percent of the outstanding shares of a state-
chartered non-member bank.99 The Control Act regulations re-
quire FDIC review before an offeror may try to acquire ten percent
control.' 00 Even though acquisitions under the BHCA are specifi-
cally excluded from the provisions of the Control Act,' 0 ' the BHCA
does not apply until a twenty-five percent interest is sought. There-
fore, if a corporate offeror proceeds slowly to establish a position in
a bank's securities before making a tender offer, it must seek FDIC
approval under the Control Act prior to gaining a ten percent inter-
est, and FRB approval under the BHCA before obtaining twenty-
five percent of the bank's outstanding shares. Corporate offerors
who acquire less than a twenty-five percent bank security interest
can be enjoined from further activity for non-compliance with the
Control Act. Because the obvious procedure would be for compa-
nies to apply under the BHCA rather than the Control Act, target
management can delay and possibly kill the tender offer for failure
to comply with the Control Act's ten percent provision.
After the bank holding company reaches the twenty-five percent
threshold, the FRB must approve any further action resulting in the
bank holding company's acquisition of five percent of any bank's
voting securities 0 2 until a majority interest is obtained (i.e., more
than fifty percent). 10 3 Because of the ten percent/twenty-five per-
cent inconsistency (which could require application for approval
under both Acts), any corporate offeror seeking to acquire control
98. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 23, 40 and accompanying text.
101. 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(16).
102. 12 C.F.R. § 225.11(c).
103. 12 C.F.R. § 225.12(c).
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of more than twenty-five percent of a target bank's voting stock
should make the tender offer prior to acquiring ten percent. In that
case, approval must be sought only from the FRB under the BHCA,
because once BHCA approval is required, the Control Act provi-
sions no longer apply. 104
C. Maryland Statutory Review
In addition to the two federal change-of-control statutes which
delay and confuse the bank tender offer scenario, section 3-314 of
the Financial Institutions Article of the Maryland Annotated Code
compounds the problem for those who would attempt to acquire a
Maryland bank.' 0 5 First, it delays acquisitions by requiring that an
offeror intending "to make a stock acquisition" apply to the Bank
Commissioner at least sixty days prior to the acquisition's effective
date.' 06 The application must include a description of the acquisi-
tion, and "all other information that is available to inform the Bank
Commissioner of the effect of the acquisition on the power to direct
... the management or policy of a banking institution or bank hold-
ing company."' 0 7 The Bank Commissioner has the statutory au-
thority to deny the approval of the stock acquisition where the
Commissioner determines that the acquisition would be "anticom-
petitive or.. . threaten the safety or soundness of a banking institu-
tion."' 0 8 Any violation of the acquisition notification requirements
of section 3-314 will result in the offeror's being prohibited from
voting its shares for five years,' 0 9 although there is no divestiture
requirement.
Furthermore, section 3-314 confuses the tender offer process
because, with its broad terms and vague language, it provides little
guidance for an offeror seeking to acquire a bank. The offeror is
told only that "all" relevant data must be provided to the Bank
Commissioner. Additionally, the discretion given the Commis-
sioner to "deny approval that . . . [the Commissioner] . . . deter-
mines to be anticompetitive or to threaten the safety or soundness
of a banking institution"'' 0 is so broad that, if the Commissioner
chooses, he or she may deny an application if the acquisition is "not
104. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(a)(2)(A), 1842(a)(1), 1817(j)(16).
105. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 3-314(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (1980 & Supp. 1985).
108. Id. § 3-314(d).
109. Id. § 3-314(e).
110. Id. § 3-314(d).
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in the public interest."'' Thus, the law is not clear as to what the
offeror must submit to the Commissioner to ensure that its applica-
tion is not disapproved, and incumbent management can seek to
postpone or even stop the tender offer by claiming the acquisition is
"not in the public interest."
The Financial Institutions Article was recently amended by the
regional banking legislation" 2 passed by the Maryland General As-
sembly in 1985. Before 1985, the Commissioner was given broad
discretion as to which characteristics to consider in granting or de-
nying approval to acquire bank securities. With respect to acquisi-
tions by out-of-state bank holding companies, the General Assembly
has now provided some specific guidance for both the offeror and
the Commissioner" 3 regarding the information to be submitted and
considered. The statutes also provide capital stock and surplus re-
quirements with which Maryland banks must comply prior to being
acquired by out-of-state bank holding companies.
These changes have positive results. First, the Bank Commis-
sioner has definable standards by which to determine whether or
not to approve a bank acquisition, resulting in both a more in-
formed and more structured review by the Commissioner's office.
Second, the prospective offeror will have specific guidance as to
what to submit when seeking Bank Commissioner approval. In the
past, standards were not evident, and meetings with the Commis-
sioner were recommended so that guidance could be given." 4
Now, at least for out-of-state bank holding company offerors, such
meetings will not be necessary because the offeror will know with
which requirements it must comply. The state banking community
and potential offerors would benefit if the General Assembly would
provide similar specific standards in section 3-314 for all offerors.
The legislature should provide uniform application requirements
such as those required by regulations under the Control Act, and by
111. Discussion with Maryland Deputy Bank Commissioner (Sept. 25, 1985). Two
denials of applications have, in fact, been made on these grounds.
112. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 5-1003(a)(4)(Supp. 1985)(stating that the
Commissioner must consider financial and managerial resources of the out-of-state bank
holding company, the future prospects of the bank being acquired, the financial history
of the bank holding company, whether the acquisition would result in an undue concen-
tration of resources or reduction of competition, and the initial capital investments, the
loan policy, the investment policy, the dividend policy, and the general plan of business
of the out-of-state bank holding company with respect to Maryland banking operations).




new section 5-1003 for acquisitions by out-of-state bank holding
companies.
In sum, the federal and state change-of-control approval stat-
utes require compliance with a time-consuming review process and
with sometimes confusing provisions. The reviews cause delays,
giving incumbent management the opportunity to fashion tender of-
fer defenses. The statutes' confusing nature results in offeror mis-
takes, leaving open the litigation door. However, the Control Act,
the BHCA, and the Maryland Annotated Code are not the only stat-
utes with which the offeror must comply. Section 14(d) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act applies to all tender offers.' 1 5
IV. THE FEDERAL TENDER OFFER REGULATIONS
Securities regulations promulgated under the Williams Act re-
quire full offeror and target management disclosure whenever
tender offers are made. This is to ensure that the shareholders, if
they choose to tender their stock, do so with their eyes open. The
Williams Act is designed to protect shareholders, not target man-
agement or tender offerors. 6 Therefore, although it contains com-
plex and comprehensive filing and disclosure requirements, the
Williams Act also permits rapid completion of tender offers and
equal protection for targets and offerors.
The Securities Exchange Act vests in banking regulatory agen-
cies the authority to enforce some of its provisions. Section 12(i) 17
provides that "the duties vested in the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission to administer and enforce Sections 12, 13, 14(c), 14(d)
[the tender offer section], 14(f) and 16, with respect to ... all other
insured banks are vested in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion. '"" l8 Thus, the FDIC enforces the Williams Act for tender of-
fers for state-chartered non-member bank securities, regardless of
whether the offeror is an individual or a bank holding company.
Section 12(i) vests similar authority in the OCC, the FRB, and the
FHLBB to regulate tender offers for securities of the financial insti-
tutions which they supervise." 9 Acquisitions of bank holding com-
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1982).
116. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982), in which Justice White
stated, "[w]e... agree ... that [in passing the Williams Act] Congress sought to protect
the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary information but also by with-
holding from management or the bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the
exercise of an informed choice."
117. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i).
118. Id.
119. Id. The FDIC, OCC, FRB, and FHLBB tender offer regulations closely parallel
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pany securities are regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, even though the bank holding company's "principal
activity ...consists of the operations of one or more subsidiary
banks.' 120
FDIC tender offer regulations1 2 ' require offerors for registered
bank shares 12 2 to meet certain notice and notification requirements.
The purpose of these disclosure requirements is not to ensure fi-
nancing adequacy or competition, as under the two federal banking
acts. Rather, the tender offer regulations are designed to provide
complete information to shareholders. On the commencement date
of the tender offer, the offeror must complete and submit copies of
the Tender Offer Statement (FDIC form F-13) to the FDIC, the tar-
get bank, any other bidder "which has filed a Form F-13 with the
FDIC," and each national exchange in which the target bank's secur-
ities are registered.' 2- The offeror also must provide certain infor-
mation to the FDIC. First, it must send copies of all "Tender Offer
Materials," including the material terms and conditions of its formal
offer, the related transmittal letter by which shareholders are to
tender their shares, and any "[p]ress releases, advertisements, let-
ters and other documents" sent by the offeror to security holders
which solicit tenders of the securities being sought in the tender of-
fer. 124 In addition, the offeror must send to the FDIC: any loan
agreements concerning funds for acquiring securities; agreements
or relationships between the offeror and the bank (including its of-
ficers or directors) or any other party with respect to the bank's se-
curities; any legal opinions concerning the tax consequences of the
tender offer; any written instructions given to persons making an
oral tender offer; and the prospectus relating to the offeror's shares
if an exchange offer is involved.' 25 The offeror must make addi-
those of the Securities and Exchange Commission. With the exception of the name of
the agency with whom the tender offer materials are filed, and names given to certain
entities (such as the target company), the tender offer regulations are virtually identical.
120. See Letter from Arthur F. Burns to Senator Thomas J. McIntyre, FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,172 (1975). The SEC also regulates the filing of consolidated financial
statements by bank holding companies. 17 C.F.R. § 210.9-01 to .9-07 (1986).
121. 12 C.F.R. § 335.501-.520 (Subpart E-Tender Offers) (1986).
122. A state-chartered non-member registered bank is a bank, other than a national
bank, which is not a member of the Federal Reserve System and whose shares must be
registered with the FDIC because there are more than 500 shareholders. 15 U.S.C.
§ 781 (g).
123. 12 C.F.R. § 335.503(a). The F-13 is the FDIC's equivalent of the SEC Schedule
14D-1. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1986).
124. 12 C.F.R. § 335.501(b)(5)(i)-(iii).
125. Id. § 335.512.
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tional filings every time it changes the offer, as well as when the offer
terminates.1 2
6
Subpart E contains, in stark detail, the requirements of full dis-
closure to target bank shareholders. The offeror must disclose to all
shareholders its identity, the identity of the target bank, the nature
of the securities being sought, and the consideration being offered
for them. The offeror must inform the shareholders of the expira-
tion date of the offer, the dates before and after which shareholders
may withdraw their securities, and the dates the securities will be
taken down pro rata. The offeror must also disclose virtually all of
the information required to be disclosed to the FDIC in the F-13.127
Thus, any past contracts, transactions, or negotiations with the tar-
get bank (F-13 item 3) must be disclosed as well as the offeror's
source and amount of funds (item 4), its "plans and proposals"
(item 5), and, if a corporate offeror, its financial statements (item
9) . 28
Under Subpart E, the offeror may notify shareholders of the
tender offer commencement by "long-form publication" or by
"summary advertisement." A "long-form" publication contains all
of the tender offer disclosures. A "summary advertisement" in-
forms the shareholders of the material aspects of the offer and in-
vites requests for further (full) disclosures (which must be promptly
distributed). The offeror may also use a "long-form" or a "sum-
mary advertisement" publication followed by a distribution of the
full disclosure materials to all shareholders appearing on the target
bank's shareholder lists. 1 29 Depending on the facts and circum-
stances of the offer, adequate long-form or summary publication
may require publication in a national newspaper, a regional or met-
ropolitan newspaper, or a combination thereof.'30 Any subsequent
changes in the offer must also be made in a manner "reasonably
designed to inform security holders of such change .... ,,131
If the offeror decides to make distributions by mailing materials
to shareholders appearing on the shareholder list, it must make
"long-form" or "summary" publication prior to requesting the list
from the target bank. 132 The bank has the option of distributing the
126. Id.
127. Id. § 335.506(e).
128. Id. § 335.506(e)(vii).
129. Id. § 335.504(a)(1)-(3).
130. Id. § 335.504(b).
131. Id. § 335.504(c).
132. Id. § 335.504(a)(1)-(3).
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materials or giving the list to the offeror so it may do so.'13 In the
case of a hostile tender offer, the offeror would want to obtain the
list so it could make direct distribution. Targets, however, do not
want offerors to have any direct contact with shareholders because,
if the tender offer is unsuccessful, the offeror could later directly
contact shareholders owning large blocks of stock either for block
voting purposes, or for attempting to increase the offeror's own
holdings by making individual purchases.' 3 4
The offeror obtains a shareholder list by submitting a request to
the bank's executive offices. The shareholder list request must in-
clude the offeror's identity and the class of securities being
bought. 13 5 Upon receipt, the bank must notify transfer agents and
any other persons who will assist it in carrying out its regulatory
obligations.' 36 It will then either ascertain that its most recently
prepared shareholder list is "timely" (i.e., prepared within ten busi-
ness days of the request) or, if not, prepare a new list.' 3 7 The bank
will then elect whether to mail the bidder's tender offer materials or
to give the offeror the list.' 38 If the bank chooses to make the distri-
bution, the offeror must pay the bank for all distribution costs.1 39
Tender offer regulations prohibit the offeror from holding
open the tender offer for less than twenty days from the commence-
133. Id. § 335.505(a)(3).
134. Offerors are forbidden, by regulation, from retaining the list, a copy of it, or any
information derived from it after the tender offer terminates, but if the offeror "remem-
bers" the names of one or two large shareholders, it could use this information to its
advantage. See 12 C.F.R. § 335.505(f).
135. Id. § 335.505(e).
136. Id. § 335.505(a)(1).
137. Id. § 335.505(a)(2).
138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
139. 12 C.F.R. § 335.505(f)-(g). The provisions also require that the bidder (1) elect
whether or not to require the subject bank to send shareholders material changes to the
tender offer materials; (2) make a long form or summary publication; (3) promptly de-
liver the tender offer materials to the target bank if it has chosen to make the share-
holder distribution, including any amendments to the tender offer materials made
subsequent to the initial offer; (4) advance to the bank the approximate distribution cost;
(5) promptly reimburse the bank any amount in excess of the amount advanced;
(6) promptly furnish requesting shareholders with copies of the tender offer materials;
(7) return the shareholder list promptly after termination of the tender offer (if the bank
elects to supply the bidder with the shareholder list rather than making the distribution
itself); (8) not retain the list, a copy of the list, or any information derived from the list
following termination of the tender offer; (9) mail, by first class mail, copies of its tender
offer materials to each person whose name appears on the list; (10) send sufficient sets
of materials to each clearing agency so that copies subsequently may be sent to benefi-
cial owners of the securities being sought; and (11) reimburse the bank for costs in-
curred in its compliance with Subpart E.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 45:1014
ment date,' 4 ° or from increasing the offered consideration unless
the tender offer remains open at least ten days from the date such an
increase is first published. 14 1 The offeror must also pay the prom-
ised consideration or return the securities at the end of the tender
offer. 142 The offeror may not extend the length of the tender offer
without a press release or a public notice published by 9:00 a.m.
eastern time of the day following the scheduled expiration date of
the original offer.'14  Further, the offeror must return securities to
shareholders who make a timely request to withdraw their shares,
1 44
and must take down securities pro rata if the tender offer is for less
than all the securities in a given class. 145 Finally, if the terms of the
tender offer are varied after commencement, the increased consid-
eration must be given to all security holders whose shares are taken
down, regardless of whether the shares were taken down before the
change in the tender offer. 14
6
V. JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS
Much of the recent litigation involving corporate takeovers in
the banking industry has concerned the constitutional issues relat-
140. Id. § 335.510(a).
141. Id. § 335.510(b).
142. Id. § 335.510(c).
143. Id. § 335.510(d).
144. Id. § 335.507(a).
145. Id. § 335.508.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982). In addition to the specific state and federal re-
quirements relating to the acquisition of control, and the tender offer requirements, any
individual considering making a tender offer for bank securities should consider ramifi-
cations of owning or obtaining a controlling interest in a bank. First, federal and state
law places restrictions on loans which banks can make to certain stockholders and direc-
tors. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 18280)(2) (1982); 12 U.S.C. § 375b(l)-(3) (1982); MD. FIN.
INST. CODE ANN. § 5-512 (Supp. 1985). Second, banks may not reduce their outstanding
common or preferred capital stock without state (Bank Commissioner) and federal ap-
proval. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(i); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 3-305 (1980 & Supp. 1985).
Unsecured loans are generally limited to fifteen percent of the unimpaired capital and
surplus, and secured loans are limited to twenty-five percent. 12 U.S.C. § 375b(l).
Loans in excess of this amount may not be made without the prior approval of the bank's
board of directors, with the interested director abstaining. Id. § 375b(2). Loans to
stockholders and directors must be on the same terms, and at the same interest rate, as
loans to other individuals, and loans involving a greater than normal repayment risk may
not be made. Id. § 375b(3). Maryland law limits the liabilities of any one person to any
commercial bank to thirty percent of the unimpaired capital and surplus of the bank.
MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 3-601(b) (1980). Loans may not exceed ten percent, except
that an additional twenty percent may be loaned if it is (1) approved by two-thirds of the




ing to interstate banking. 47 However, decisions relating to the
Control Act, the BHCA, and the Williams Act tend to demonstrate
that "a company's ownership of a regulated business is one of the
best defenses against an unwelcome acquisition,"' 4 8 and "[a]mong
regulated industries, none is better insulated from hostile takeover
than banking."' 49 Not only will the various regulatory procedural
traps ensnare the potential offeror, but the very threat of litigation
due to the offeror's failure to comply fully with the regulatory re-
quirements can bring the tender offer to a grinding halt. For exam-
ple, as one target's board responded to a "bear hug" letter:
As you are aware, regulatory approvals require the
submission of complete applications to the various regula-
tory authorities and an affirmative finding by them that the
applicable statutory standards have been met .... [T]he
Comptroller of the Currency requested and has not yet re-
ceived 'detailed biographical data'... , 'definitive [financ-
ing] information' . . . , [and] 'detailed financial statements
for each of the investors'. . . . We are further advised that
the application that you tendered to the State of New York
Banking Department is not ... complete... and has not
been ... accepted .... The federal Change in Bank Con-
trol Act ... sets forth ... specific disclosure standards ....
Since the information required by the agencies had not
been submitted ... nor the requisite approvals obtained, it
is premature for the Board to evaluate your proposed
tender offer.' 50
Judicial interpretations and FRB orders fully support a conclu-
sion that Congress placed a greater burden on offerors for bank se-
curities than was placed on tender offerors in general. In particular,
one intent of Congress in passing the Williams Act was to ensure
that neither management nor the bidder would have "any undue
advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed
choice"'' by investors in deciding whether or not to tender their
shares. The BHCA and the Control Act both provide management
with an arsenal of rules and regulations with which it can delay the
proceedings and stymie the tender offer entirely. For example, in
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. D 'Annunzio,152 a United States
147. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
148. HAWKE & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at 646.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 606-07.
151. Steinberg, supra note 16, at 251.
152. FDIC v. D'Annunzio, 524 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. W. Va. 1981).
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district court acknowledged that the Control Act requires FDIC no-
tification prior to obtaining twenty-five percent control. Further,
the regulations promulgated thereunder require prior notification
by one who acquires more than ten percent ownership if, "immedi-
ately after the transaction, no other person will own a greater por-
tion of that class of voting securities."' 3  The court then
determined that a group of individuals which when "push came to
shove"' 54 would vote their stock as a group would exercise control
of more than ten percent of the stock, and, as a group, would hold
more stock than any other individual. Therefore, the court enjoined
the individuals from assuming control of the bank because they had
not complied with the Control Act's notification provisions.'155
In Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Allbritton,'56 the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a
preliminary injunction against Allbritton's tender offer for 600,000
shares of Riggs stock. In so doing the court found possible Control
Act violations, as well as violations of the Williams Act antifraud
provisions.' The history behind the Riggs case demonstrates
graphically the regulatory hurdles placed in front of tender
offerors. 1
5 8
Allbritton wholly owned Perpetual Corporation (Perpetual) and
University Bancshares, Inc. (University), the latter being a one bank
holding company. Perpetual wholly owned Pierce National Life In-
surance Company (Pierce) which, in December 1980, owned 2.1
percent of Riggs outstanding voting stock. On December 4, 1980,
Allbritton and University contracted to buy thirteen percent of
Riggs stock, and on December 9, Allbritton, Pierce, and University
filed their Control Act application. OnJanuary 13, 1981, the OCC
notified Allbritton that it did not intend to disapprove the applica-
tion. On January 22, Allbritton purchased 7.93 percent of Riggs
outstanding shares and University purchased 4.98 percent (keeping
it below the BHCA five percent threshold). On February 9, Allbrit-
153. Id. at 699.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 701. As another example, the OCC has interpreted the Change in Bank
Control Act as requiring review prior to the creation of a voting trust which controls
more than ten percent of the outstanding voting stock of a national bank. See Letter
from Frederick R. Medero, Director, Securities Disclosure Division (Apr. 25, 1980), FED.
BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 85,221.
156. 516 F. Supp. 164 (D.D.C. 1981) (hereinafter Riggs).
157. Id. at 175-77, 178-80.
158. For a concise history of the Riggs case, see Letter from the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System to John D. Hawke, Jr. (Mar. 4, 1981) [1981-82 Transfer
Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 98,651.
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ton made a tender offer for 600,000 shares of Riggs (about twenty
percent of the outstanding shares). On February 25, Riggs peti-
tioned the FRB to institute proceedings under the BHCA. On
March 2, University sold its shares to Allbritton, making his individ-
ual holdings equal to 12.9 percent of Riggs outstanding shares. The
FRB, on March 4, 1981, determined that Allbritton was acting as an
individual, and because no company with which he was involved
owned more than five percent of Riggs stock, no notice was required
by the BHCA.' 59 However, this apparent victory before the FRB
was not sufficient to ensure smooth sailing for the Allbritton offer.
On March 17, 1981, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction, which tempo-
rarily chilled Allbritton's tender offer.' 6 ° The court held first that
Allbritton violated section 14(e) by omitting a material fact in his
offer by failing to disclose his personal finances. It so held because
the target was a national bank; sixty-five percent of the voting shares
would remain outstanding after the offer; and Allbritton's nondis-
closure of his net worth, the valuation of his major assets, the sched-
ule of interest charges on the debt created to make the offer, the
anticipated source of the interest payments, and the source of funds
for principal repayment, was material. 16 '
The court then addressed the interrelationship between the
Control Act and the tender offer materials filed under the Exchange
Act. 162 Allbritton notified the OCC of a potential tender offer prior
to receiving the OCC's consent to purchase 12.9 percent of the out-
standing shares. When Allbritton distributed his tender offer mater-
ials in compliance with the Exchange Act and the OCC
implementing regulations, he said that no further Control Act ap-
provals were required. Riggs claimed that the OCC's notification
applied only to the January 22 acquisition of 12.9 percent, and not
to the tender offer. Therefore, Riggs maintained, the tender offer
violated the Control Act (because prior approval of the tender offer
was not obtained) and the Williams Act (because Allbritton did not
disclose in his tender offer materials that further approval from the
OCC would be required).
Even though the OCC was aware when it issued its January 13
notice that Allbritton might eventually offer to buy as many as
700,000 shares of Riggs, the district court determined that Allbrit-
159. Id. See also Riggs, 516 F. Supp. at 169-70.
160. Riggs, 516 F. Supp. at 175.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 175-81.
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ton may have failed to comply with the Control Act.t 63 Specifically,
the Act requires OCC review prior to an individual's obtaining
twenty-five percent control, or actual control (which the regulations
consider to be ten percent). Even though the OCC reviewed and
did not disapprove Allbritton's 12.9 percent acquisition, the court
determined that 12.9 percent, in this case, might not be "actual con-
trol,"' 16 4 and the OCC might have to review its decision prior to the
offeror's obtaining twenty-five percent. The court said that "[a]
contrary view of requirements under the Control Act and its regula-
tions would raise the possibility of an acquiring person's gaining
clearance at a 10% ownership level, and being free to make subse-
quent acquisitions regardless of any risk those purchases might pose
to the target bank and its depositors."'' 65 The court went on to say
that Riggs had met its burden of showing that "it remains a matter
of speculation whether or not the Comptroller has 'no objection' to
Allbritton's acquisition of a controlling interest."' 66 Allbritton's
statement in the tender offer materials that no further OCC ap-
proval was required was "not only a misstatement but also mislead-
ing in violation of Section 14(e) of the Williams Act."' 67 The court
then temporarily enjoined Allbritton from proceeding with the
tender offer, and Riggs successfully delayed its completion. 168
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Banks should not be deregulated, but the regulations under
which they operate should be consistent and clear, and should re-
quire efficiency on the part of the regulatory agencies. The banking
acts and the Williams Act can and should coexist so that the agen-
cies can ensure financial health and competition, offerors and target
management can struggle for control on an equal footing, and
163. Id. at 178-80.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 180.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 180-81. Allbritton subsequently completed his tender offer. On March 23,
1981, a settlement agreement was signed by Riggs and Allbritton, among others, per-
mitting his tender offer to go forward. Allbritton agreed to vote for the nominees of the
Riggs Board, to abstain from borrowing from the Riggs National Corporation holding
company to finance the tender offer, and to vote to approve a merger and reorganization
plan supported by the Riggs Board. In return, Riggs agreed to drop all opposition to
the tender offer, including all pending litigation, and to place Allbritton on the Board.
See Acquisition Statement Filed Pursuant to § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and 12 C.F.R. § 11.4(g)(2) (Amendment No. 7) (Mar. 24, 1981) (available by re-
quest from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, D.C.).
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shareholders can be assured that they will receive all the informa-
tion they need to intelligently determine whether to tender their
shares.
Complex problems such as those presented in this Comment
deserve solutions. A fine balance must be maintained between
equal treatment under the Williams Act and adequate regulatory
control under the banking acts. Of primary consideration should be
the continued health of financial institutions so that no individuals
ever lose money which they have deposited. The grim truth is that
without adequate agency review and approval, unqualified investors
can gain control of financial institutions and drive them into debt.
The Maryland savings and loan crisis demonstrates this fact.
The conflict between the securities and banking laws exists be-
cause the laws were drafted with different purposes in mind. The
Williams Act was designed to ensure that shareholders had full and
accurate information when making important decisions about their
corporate securities and that they were not defrauded. 169 The Con-
trol Act and the BHCA were intended to ensure the continued fi-
nancial viability of banks so that changes in control would not lead
to monopolies, anticompetitive practices, or harm to the "conve-
niences and needs" of the communities the banks service.' 70 Both
goals are commendable, but the acts conflict.
The Williams Act seeks equality for both the bidder and man-
agement. 7 1 However, because of the extreme complexity found in
the BHCA and the Control Act, the target bank's management is at
a distinct advantage at the outset of any tender offer. The sixty-day
approval deadlines provide management with extra time to defend.
Tendering shareholders can withdraw their shares after sixty days
under the Williams Act, and can accept a sweeter bid from a "White
Knight."' 172 Management can seek injunctive relief, or can seek in-
tervention by the applicable federal agency. By having so many reg-
ulatory remedies, the target bank can make the tender offer such an
expensive proposition that the offeror may be forced to withdraw
his bid. This is not to say that banks do not remain attractive
targets. The acquisition of banks is, however, a difficult and expen-
sive proposition in which only the most carefully laid plans will
guarantee success.
In order to reduce the advantage it has given to target bank
169. Steinberg, supra note 16, at 251.
170. See, e.g., HAWKE & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at 46-47.
171. Steinberg, supra note 16, at 251.
172. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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management, Congress should review the relationships among and
between the Control Act, the BHCA, and the Williams Act. It
should attempt to reduce the delays that the banking acts cause and
make the acts more uniform, thereby reducing confusion. There are
three relatively simple amendments that could be made. Each
would allow the regulators to maintain control of bank ownership
while complying with the Williams Act spirit.
First, responsibility for approving bank holding company acqui-
sitions of bank securities should be removed from the FRB and
given to the primary bank regulator. This change would make the
primary regulator ultimately responsible for approving bank hold-
ing company acquisitions, as it now is responsible for acquisitions by
individuals. For example, the FDIC should approve acquisitions of
state chartered non-member bank securities, regardless of whether
the offeror is an individual or a bank holding company. The FRB
could still be required to review the application and make recom-
mendations, but the contact point should be between the bank and
the FDIC.
This recommendation is straightforward. Under the existing
regulatory scheme, a classic example of over-regulation, the offeror
must seek acquisition approval from numerous regulators and su-
pervisors. The process would be simpler and more thorough and
efficient if the offeror filed one application for acquisition approval
with the primary federal regulator. That agency would seek and co-
ordinate comments and recommendations from the FRB, the De-
partment of Justice, and the appropriate state banking supervisor
prior to granting approval.
The impact of this change would be dramatic. First, rather than
having to file three or four applications, the offeror would have to
file only one. Target management could not stifle offers by claiming
that the offeror was not seeking approval from the appropriate
agency. Second, the approval process would be coordinated. One
agency, rather than three or four, would have ultimate responsibility
for determining whether to approve the acquisition. Finally, uni-
form standards would be considered for all acquisitions of similar
banks. For example, acquisitions of Maryland non-member state-
chartered banks would be governed by FDIC guidelines, and offer-
ors would be aware of the applicable standards. The state bank su-
pervisor would make his or her recommendations to the FDIC
based on these standards. The FRB would remain responsible for
approving bank holding company aspects, and the Department of
Justice would ensure that the acquisition was not anticompetitive.
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The ultimate decision-maker, however, would be the primary bank
regulator-either the FDIC, the FRB, the OCC, or the FHLBB.
A second change would reduce confusion between the BHCA
and the Control Act provisions and would prevent duplicate filing
requirements. The two acts have different security acquisition ap-
proval thresholds, which can result in enforcement under both acts.
The BHCA's approval threshold is five percent ownership after the
bank holding company acquires a twenty-five percent interest. The
Control Act's regulations require agency review of acquisitions in
which the offeror obtains ten percent of the target bank's securities
if the securities are registered, and if there are no shareholders with
larger holdings.
The Control Act and the BHCA have similar legislative pur-
poses. When it passed the BHCA in 1956, Congress intended to
maintain competition and financial stability when companies ac-
quired control of banks. The purpose of the 1978 Control Act was
to accomplish the same goal for individual acquisitions. Both acts
ensure regulatory agency approval before one party, whether an in-
dividual or a company, gains "control." It was not Congress' intent
for companies to have to seek approval under the Control Act at a
lower security ownership threshold than they had to meet under the
BHCA. This was, however, accomplished when the agencies drafted
their Control Act implementing regulations.
The definition of "control" should be the same for both acts,
and regulators should not be permitted to amend the definition as if
by whim, as they have under the Control Act. In both the BHCA
and the Control Act, Congress implied that the twenty-five percent
level indicated that a controlling interest had been attained. There-
fore, the preliminary review under both Acts should take place at
that level. Thereafter, when either an individual or a company ac-
quires a ten percent interest in a different bank, a subsequent review
should take place to ensure that the acquisition will not result in
reductions in competition and that the offeror is financially suitable.
The effect of the change would be that companies would be re-
quired to file under the BHCA and individuals would be required to
file under the Control Act, as Congress originally intended. In no
circumstance would either party be required to file under both acts,
which was not the intent of Congress but which is now the case.
A third recommended amendment to the banking acts would be
to significantly reduce the time allowed for agency approval of the
proposed acquisition, and to require uniformity in the manner in
which approval is granted. As indicated throughout this Comment,
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delays chill hostile tender offers, giving incumbent management an
inherent advantage. Since the Williams Act permits shareholders to
withdraw their tendered shares sixty days after tender offer com-
mencement, under no circumstances should agencies be allowed to
delay approval beyond that time.
Banking regulators maintain mountains of data on all of the
banks they supervise, and there is no reason in our computer age for
approval to take longer than forty-five days. When the primary reg-
ulator receives the tender offer materials and the control acquisition
approval application, notice should be published within three days
in the Federal Register, requesting public comment within thirty days.
At the same time, relevant data should be sent to the Department of
Justice for antitrust review, to the FRB for bank holding company
review, and to the banking supervisor. Thirty-day deadlines should
be imposed. Upon the receipt of all comments, the primary regula-
tor would have twelve days to consider the comments and deter-
mine whether to deny the application. This could leave a fifteen-day
cushion in which the offeror could take down the tendered shares,
essentially giving it equal treatment under the Williams Act.
The second aspect of this proposal is that the Control Act and
BHCA approval procedures should be the same. Currently, affirma-
tive approval is required under the BHCA, but the Control Act per-
mits acquisition as long as the approval application is not
disapproved. Again, there does not appear to be a reason for this
inconsistency. In order to ensure that the forty-five day deadline is
met, agencies should be required to disapprove the acquisition within
forty-five days if they intend to do so at all. This would permit offer-
ors to take down shares earlier if they received notice of the agency's
decision "not to disapprove" as under current law, and would also
ensure that under no circumstances would the offeror be forced to
wait more than forty-five days before knowing whether or not the
tender offer could proceed. If the offeror does not receive notice
that the application is disapproved within forty-five days, control ac-
quisition should be allowed.
Admittedly, these recommendations are not the only ones
which would resolve the existing dilemma, and they are certainly
subject to challenge. However, they are offered as a possible solu-
tion to the chilling effect of banking laws on tender offers, and will
hopefully serve as a starting point for reform.
HAMISH S. OSBORNE
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